. While these six nations—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—presented unified public condemnation of Israeli and American military actions against Iran, their private positions reveal a far more complex calculus shaped by security dependencies, economic interests, and regional power dynamics

. US Congressional delegations who visited the region during the conflict reported that Arab leaders expressed far more nuanced views in private conversations, with some showing barely concealed relief that Israel was addressing Iran’s nuclear capabilities

. This contradiction stems from the fundamental dilemma facing Gulf monarchies: how to balance public solidarity with Iranian sovereignty against private concerns about Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions and nuclear program.

The GCC’s emergency ministerial meeting on June 15 produced a unified condemnation of Israeli strikes, characterizing them as violations of Iranian sovereignty and international law.

. However, intelligence sources and diplomatic reporting suggest this public unity masked significant private divergences in how each member state viewed the strategic implications of Iran’s nuclear degradation.

. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s government issued statements expressing “strong condemnation and denunciation of the blatant Israeli aggressions against the brotherly Islamic Republic of Iran” . However, US lawmakers reported that Saudi officials were “much more worried about Israel initiating this and they focused more on Gaza than anything else,” while still acknowledging that “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon” when pressed.

The Saudi position reflects the Kingdom’s broader strategic calculus regarding regional leadership and its potential normalization with Israel.

. Saudi officials made clear that any progress toward the Abraham Accords remains contingent on “an irreversible path to a Palestinian state,” using the crisis to reinforce this prerequisite while privately recognizing the benefits of Iranian nuclear degradation.

 

. Abu Dhabi’s official statements emphasized the need for “immediate de-escalation” and warned against actions that could lead to “new levels of instability” . However, private conversations revealed what one US official described as UAE leaders being “in awe of what Israel’s been able to do” in its operations inside Iran.

Despite this vulnerability, Qatar leveraged its unique position to become the primary mediator in achieving the ceasefire. Qatari officials worked directly with both Iranian and US leadership, with President Trump specifically thanking Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani for his mediation efforts.

. Kuwaiti officials expressed “deep concern” about attacks on Iranian sovereignty while calling for political solutions . However, private discussions revealed shared concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and appreciation for its degradation.

. Kuwait’s position reflects its dual vulnerability: complete dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for energy exports while hosting significant US military forces that could become Iranian targets. This has led Kuwait to emphasize diplomatic solutions while privately supporting outcomes that reduce Iranian capabilities to threaten Gulf shipping lanes.

The kingdom’s subdued response also reflects its internal security concerns, as the Sunni monarchy rules over a majority Shia population that could be influenced by Iranian messaging. By avoiding harsh criticism of anti-Iranian actions while calling for diplomacy, Bahrain threaded the needle between regional solidarity and strategic alignment with US interests.

 

. This position reflects Oman’s unique role as a regional diplomatic facilitator and its stronger economic relationship with Iran . The sultanate has historically served as a mediator between Iran and the US, including facilitating nuclear negotiations.

.However, Oman’s strong public position should not be interpreted as support for Iranian nuclear ambitions. Rather, it reflects the sultanate’s broader diplomatic strategy of maintaining relationships with all regional powers while emphasizing the importance of diplomatic rather than military solutions to regional disputes.

.

The economic relationship between GCC states and Iran adds another layer of complexity, with total bilateral trade reaching $13.8 billion in 2023, dominated by UAE-Iran commerce. Qatar’s shared gas field with Iran creates particular complications, as any escalation could threaten the world’s largest natural gas reserve.

. With over 40,000 US personnel stationed across the region, primarily in GCC countries, these states understand that their security ultimately depends on American protection against Iranian threats.

.The targeting of Al Udeid Air Base demonstrated the vulnerability of this arrangement, as Iran’s retaliation directly threatened Qatar despite its attempts to maintain neutrality.

. While UAE and Bahrain maintained their existing relationships with Israel despite public criticism of its actions, the pathway for Saudi and Qatari normalization has become more complex . Saudi officials reinforced that Palestinian statehood remains a prerequisite for normalization, using the crisis to strengthen this bargaining position.

However, some US officials suggest that Iranian weakness resulting from the conflict could actually enhance long-term prospects for expanded normalization.

. As one congressman noted, if Iran is “defeated significantly” by Israel, it could “increase the opportunities in the longer term for the expansion of the Abraham Accords”.

. While Iran’s threatened closure of the Strait of Hormuz did not materialize, the crisis demonstrated how quickly regional tensions can affect energy supplies and pricing.

. This role could provide Gulf states with greater strategic autonomy, allowing them to shape outcomes rather than simply react to great power confrontations.

The crisis has also accelerated discussions about regional security architecture, with increased coordination between GCC emergency management centers and enhanced focus on radiological and environmental protection measures.

. Iranian officials’ threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pursue nuclear weapons openly suggest that the conflict may accelerate rather than prevent nuclear proliferation.

.For GCC states, this creates new strategic imperatives. The temporary degradation of Iranian capabilities provides a window for diplomatic initiatives, but the potential for Iranian nuclear acceleration requires continued coordination with US security guarantees and possibly expanded regional defense cooperation.

. While all six states publicly condemned Israeli and US military actions against Iran, their private positions ranged from cautious satisfaction with Iranian degradation to active diplomatic facilitation of conflict resolution.

This analysis demonstrates that understanding Gulf politics requires looking beyond official statements to examine the underlying strategic, economic, and security factors that drive decision-making.

. The GCC states’ response to the June 2025 crisis illustrates their growing sophistication in managing competing pressures from great power competition, regional threats, and domestic constituencies while preserving their core interests in stability and security.

The crisis has ultimately strengthened the case for GCC diplomatic coordination while highlighting the limitations of public unity in the face of divergent strategic interests.

. As regional dynamics continue to evolve, the Gulf states’ ability to balance these competing pressures will remain crucial for regional stability and their own survival as viable political entities in an increasingly polarized Middle East.

 

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